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ABSTRACT 
Author: Steven E. Durnin 
Title: The Professional Air Traffic Controllers 
Strike: A Retrospective Analysis 
Institution: Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University 
Degree: Master of Aeronautical Science 
Year: 1994 
The purpose of this study was to assess the opinions, 
beliefs, and perspectives of former air traffic controllers 
who were terminated from employment with the Federal 
Aviation Administration for participating in the 
Professional Air Traffic Controllers Organization (PATCO) 
strike of 1981. The study examines the perceptions of the 
former controllers to determine their feelings toward the 
justification for going on strike over 13 years ago. This 
is relevant in light of recent events including the lifting 
of the ban against rehiring PATCO controllers by the 
Clinton Administration. 
The data collected for this study were obtained with an 
opinionnaire mailed via a newsletter to former controllers 
who were members of the PATCO union. It was expected that a 
majority of the controllers would feel their actions of 1981 
were justified. This feeling, however, would be mitigated 
by the fact that the controllers were terminated for their 
actions and sacrificed their careers with the decision 
to strike. 
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TERMS 
AFL - American Federation of Labor 
ALPA - Air Line Pilots Association 
ARTCC - Air Route Traffic Control Center 
ATA - Air Transport Association 
ATC - Air Traffic Control 
ATCS - Air Traffic Control Specialist 
CAA - Civil Aeronautics Authority 
CERAPS - Combined Center and RAPCON 
CIO - Committee on Industrial Organization 
CIO - Congress of Industrial Organizations 
FAA - Federal Aviation Administration 
FAM - Familiarization (i.e., ATCS Access to air 
line cockpits for familiarization purposes) 
FPL - Full Performance Level 
IWW - International Workers of the World 
KOL - Knights of Labor 
MCA - Metropolitan Controllers Association 
MEBA - Marine Engineer's Beneficial Association 
NAGE - National Association of Government Workers 
NATCA - National Air Traffic Controllers Association 
NTSB - National Transportation Safety Board 
OJT - On-The-Job-Training 
xi 
PATCO - Professional Air Traffic Controllers 
Organization 
RAPCON - Radar Approach Control Facility (Military) 
SCABS - Derogatory term describing those who do not 
participate in a strike, as seen by those who 
do. 
Sprinters - In this case, those who ran back to the FAA 
when the 48 hour deadline was announced. 
TRACAB - Terminal Radar Approach Control in Tower Cab 
TRACON - Terminal Radar Approach Control Facility 
Union - Association of workers to promote and protect 
the welfare, interests, and rights of its 
members, primarily through collective 
bargaining. 




On August 3, 1981, a strike was called by the 
Professional Air Traffic Controllers Organization (PATCO) in 
an effort to seek concessions from the United States 
government. The strike resulted in the termination of nearly 
12,000 air traffic control specialists and the 
decertification of the PATCO union. 
Thirteen years have passed since the strike but 
questions still persist from the users of air traffic control 
services regarding the level to which the nation's air 
traffic control system has recovered. These questions are 
relevant in light of the fact that a new union, the National 
Air Traffic Controllers Association (NATCA), has been formed. 
This retrospective analysis of controller's perceptions and 
opinions regarding the 1981 strike provides insight into the 
psychology of professionals willing to sacrifice their 
careers for a cause. Additionally, analysis of the data 
harvested in this study provides information which could be 
applied to future labor relations in negotiations where the 
prevention of a similar strike is of great social importance. 
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2 
Statement of the Problem 
The purpose of this study is to examine, through an 
opinionnaire, the feelings of air traffic controllers who 
were terminated for their involvement in the PATCO strike of 
August 3, 1981. An evaluation of the fired controller's 
opinions will determine whether the strike was justified and 
worth the loss of their chosen careers. 
Review of Related Literature 
This study examines the perceptions of Air Traffic 
Controllers who were fired from their chosen profession for 
acting on the belief that, by uniting together in the 
withdrawal of their services from their employer, they could 
effect change. The controllers, like millions of other 
American workers, were members of a labor union. A labor 
union is described as "an association of workers to promote 
and protect the welfare, interests, and rights of its 
members, primarily by collective bargaining" (Websters, 1988, 
p. 1327). 
To provide a background to the study, a brief review of 
the origins of organized labor in general and of the PATCO 
union in particular will be presented. Following this 
review, the circumstances and the atmosphere in which the 
PATCO strike of 1981 took place will be introduced. This 
approach is designed to illustrate the strike not as an 
arbitrary incident, but rather a culmination of events that 
arguably may have been patterned by union history. 
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Origins of organized labor in the United States. 
The organization of labor in the United States began 
approximately two hundred years ago in the late 1700s. Then, 
as now, differences existed between employees and employers 
regarding work hours, wages, and complaints pertinent to 
particular vocations. The withdrawal of services from an 
employer by employees (striking) dates back to the late 1700s 
as well, as evidenced by the New York City Printers strike in 
1794, the Cabinet Makers strike in 1796, the Federal Society 
of Journeymen Cordwainers (shoemakers) of Philadelphia, and 
the Pittsburgh Shoemakers who struck in 1809 (Mills, 1989). 
In 1871, the Knights of Labor (KOL) emerged as a 
dominant force for labor. The KOL was notable as being among 
the first unions to exploit the effectiveness of political 
allies and was able to exert strong political influence 
during its relatively short twenty-two year lifespan. The 
KOL served as an example of how there can be strength in 
numbers, and demonstrated the importance of political support 
in achieving goals. The end of the KOL came about in 1893 
due to a bombing during a radical rally which resulted in the 
deaths of seven police officers (Mills, 1989). Such acts of 
violence were commonplace during this period and were an 
unfortunate by-product of the growth of labor. 
Following the KOL, the American Federation of Labor 
(AFL) was established and it enjoyed much success in its 
organizing efforts through the years of World War I (WWI) and 
into 1920. The 1920s, however, were much less successful 
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years for unions in existence at that time. Early in the 
decade there was a severe recession which weakened the unions 
to a nearly ineffective state. As the economy rebounded and 
eventually made a strong comeback, the unionization effort 
was not able to keep pace. A causal factor for the slow 
growth in union membership during this period was the onset 
of mass production processes that used unskilled labor. This 
class of employees, unlike the skilled tradespeople, was not 
initially sought for membership as the unionization effort 
got underway. 
Another component of labor's growth was the introduction 
of the Committee on Industrial Organization (CIO) in the 
1930s. The CIO, with unexpected ease, was able to grasp 
representation rights for the Unites States Steel 
Corporation. Historically significant, this gain acted as a 
catalyst to many other organizing victories, including one 
with the Ford Motor Company. The CIO was bitterly opposed by 
the Ford Company in its organizing bid of Ford, and was also 
contested by the AFL in this effort. Its success, however, 
firmly entrenched the CIO in the American labor mainstream. 
By 1941, the CIO had organized the steel, auto, rubber, 
and meat packing industries on a virtually exclusive 
basis and was challenging the AFL in many other 
industries. In the process the CIO had broken 
completely with the AFL. In May 1938, the AFL expelled 
the CIO unions from membership, and they established a 
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rival federation, the Congress of Industrial 
Organizations (also CIO), ... (Mills, 1989, p. 44). 
It was clear at this point in the development of organized 
labor that not only were there rifts between employees and 
employers, but there were organizing rivalries among the 
major representative organizations as well. Both the AFL and 
the CIO were able to increase their numbers considerably 
during the years of World War II (WWII), but by 1943 the AFL 
had taken a substantial lead as shown in Table 1: 
Table 1 
Trade Union Membership (in thousands) 
AFL CIO Independent Total 
1934 3045 
1938 3623 4038 
1941 4569 5000 
1943 6564 5285 1793 13,642 
Note. From US Dept. of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, 
Handbook of Labor Statistics (Washington, D.C.: US Govt. 
Printing Office, December 1980), Bulletin no. 2070, p. 411. 
The AFL and the CIO were rival unions with different 
ideals. However, in 1952 the presidents of both unions 
passed away and were replaced by George Meany for the AFL and 
Walter P. Reuther for the CIO. Discussions had been taking 
place regarding a merger of the two unions, and now that 
there was a new leadership core, there remained little of the 








AFL and the CIO merged in 1955 and became the huge private 
sector entity that people are familiar with today, the AFL-
CIO. The AFL-CIO showed moderate growth through the 1960s 
but never again reached the levels witnessed in the 1930s and 
1940s. In fact, the 1970s brought about a transition whereby 
the most growth was in the public sector which includes 
state, local and federal employees. 
Origins of PATCO. 
Among those public employees to become unionized in the 
1960s and 1970s were the nations1 air traffic controllers, 
who organized in 1968. The move to unionize followed years 
of controller complaints regarding staffing and equipment 
that had not received adequate administrative support. 
The origins of today's air traffic control system date 
back to the early 1930s. Airlines at that time were 
concerned with the possibility that the growing number of 
aircraft filling the skies could become hazardous, and formed 
collaborations to share information regarding the positions 
of their aircraft. The involvement of the government began 
in 1934 when it implemented directional altitude separation 
standards. In 1936, a number of airlines further agreed to 
begin operating three experimental airway traffic control 
stations located in Newark, Chicago and Cleveland. Later 
that year the government became more deeply involved in air 
traffic when the Bureau of Air Commerce acquired the stations 
and forged the beginning of the federally managed air traffic 
control system. 
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The system developed slowly, with no major attempts at 
expansion until late in the 1940s when WWII came to an end. 
At that time there was a multitude of trained airmen 
returning to the country looking for employment flying for 
the airlines. The Civil Aeronautics Authority (CAA) then 
opened up funding for additional airway facilities and 
staffing, allowing air traffic growth and beginning the 
modern age of air travel and air traffic control (Shostak & 
Skocik, 1986) . 
The 1950s was an era of heavy airline growth that began 
to tax the budding air traffic system's capacity-
Controllers were using equipment which was WWII vintage, 
taken from Air Force facilities and aircraft carriers. 
Controller complaints of the inadequacies of the equipment 
went essentially unanswered until 1956 when, in the course of 
two weeks, two avoidable air crashes claimed the lives of 202 
people (Shostak & Skocik, 1986). The public was unaccustomed 
to hearing of such disasters, especially in an expanding new 
industry like aviation. In 1958 the Federal Aviation Agency 
(FAA) was created, assuming the responsibilities held by the 
CAA. At this point there were nearly 13,000 controllers in 
the workplace. While some improvements were made, system 
failures remained evident. Attention was focused on the FAA 
in 1963 when a major midair collision occurred, publicly 
exposing some of the failings of the FAA. According to 
Shostak & Skocik (1986), what came to light was a controller 
workforce that in 1963 was very disillusioned. There had 
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been no new hires added to the system since 1961 and 
controllers were being forced, under the threat of dismissal, 
to work eight to ten hour days, six days a week. Additional 
problems affecting the controllers were the lack of any 
notice being given when enforcing the overtime mandate, the 
use of much of the same "archaic" equipment, and the tendency 
to attach blame for an aviation accident or incident to the 
controller rather than to admit to a problem that may 
discredit the system. These growing signs of antagonism were 
beginning to manifest themselves in an adversarial 
relationship between the controllers and the FAA management. 
In 1962 President Kennedy issued Executive Order 10988 
permitting unions to organize in the public sector and 
obliging federal agencies to negotiate with these unions in a 
responsible manner. A stipulation of this order was that the 
unions involved in public sector negotiations could not 
bargain over wages, hours, insurance, retirement, or other 
like matters that fell under the jurisdiction of the Civil 
Service Commission, requiring Congressional action in order 
to be changed. The National Association of Government 
Employees (NAGE) was one of the first federal employee 
associations organized, and they extended invitations to 
various air traffic facility locals to join. Many locals did 
join, but by doing so they handicapped themselves by being 
independent of other facilities, and due to their isolation 
were unable to effect substantive gains. 
9 
In 1967, controllers at the Chicago OfHare facility had 
become disgruntled over the staffing and mandatory overtime 
issues. When agreements reached on a regional level were 
denied by the FAA, the OfHare controllers enacted a "rule 
book" job action (A "rule book" job action means that a 
controller, in performing his/her duties, would control 
traffic precisely by FAA procedures. The many methods 
commonly used by controllers to expedite the flow of air 
traffic are not employed.). Because O'Hare is one of the 
busiest traffic centers in the country, the job action taken 
there had a tremendous affect and snarled air traffic 
throughout the country. The FAA acquiesced and almost 
immediately agreed to annual increases of $1,100 per 
controller, attributing the increase only to the cost of 
living in the area, and vowed that like increases would not 
be made elsewhere (Shostak & Skocik, 1986). Other heavy 
volume facilities soon followed suit in asking for increases 
and in some cases, like Los Angeles, were successful. These 
successes were small and local in nature, and the realization 
that a consolidated approach to representation would be 
required began to receive support. 
A group of controllers from a newly formed organization, 
the Metropolitan Controllers Association (MCA) representing 
controllers from Atlanta, Chicago, New York, Newark and 
Philadelphia, determined that in order to begin an 
association with national potential, there would have to be a 
key person to serve as a catalyst in getting the organization 
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off the ground. The person chosen to fill this role and lead 
the newly formed organization was F. Lee Bailey, a renowned 
attorney with a proven history of accomplishments. Mr. 
Bailey was approached on January 4, 1968, with the 
controllers proposal. He accepted, with the fee for his 
services set at $100.00, plus expenses, for a period of six 
months (Shostak & Skocik, 1986). 
The first organizational meeting called by Bailey was 
expected to draw approximately 100 controllers. Instead, a 
crowd of more than 600 controllers plus 100 of their spouses 
from 22 states showed up. They listened to Bailey in a two 
hour speech termed as "spellbinding" that was recorded and 
made available for playback to controllers in all 50 states. 
Within one month the new organization had enlisted over 4,000 
controllers and the Professional Air Traffic Controllers 
Organization was born (Shostak & Skocik, 1986). 
Events culminating in the 1981 PATCO strike. 
The name PATCO was purposely chosen to depict a 
professional association rather than a labor union (Shostak & 
Skocik, 1986). The first year of PATCO saw the adoption of 
its constitution and its first attempt at reaching a 
collective bargaining agreement with the FAA. F. Lee Bailey 
made an agreement that addressed controller concerns over 
wage reclassification, reopening of the air traffic 
controller training academy, and controller exemption from 
civil service regulations as they applied to other public 
workers because of the unique nature of the air traffic 
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control profession. This hand-shake agreement, according to 
Shostak & Skocik (1986) was between honorable gentlemen that, 
despite the urging of other members of PATCOfs leadership, 
was not put into writing. Subsequently, the agreement was 
not honored by the FAA and because of this perceived failure, 
Bailey's reputation among the controllers was tarnished. 
Meanwhile, as PATCO struggled to become a viable 
representative for the controllers, a task force had been 
commissioned during 1968 to look into air traffic controller 
grievances. The findings of the task force were released in 
1970 and supported the controller's claims that their 
profession required more of them than those of most federal 
employees. Reforms recommended to the FAA included a sharp 
reduction in work hours, the upgrading of equipment and 
facilities, the reduction of required overtime, the expansion 
of intervals between shift rotations, the revision of pay 
criteria, and that negotiations should take place (Shostak & 
Skocik, 1986). 
PATCO faced a severe challenge to its existence in 1970 
when the FAA chose to relocate four active PATCO members from 
their Baton Rouge facility against their will. PATCO1s 
threatened sickout to protest the forced moves resulted in 
another negotiating session involving F. Lee Bailey and FAA 
management. Bailey worked out an agreement that other PATCO 
leaders, remembering the first failed attempt, demanded its 
negotiated terms be committed to writing. Bailey, convinced 
he had received appropriate assurances, did not heed the 
12 
demand and settled for a gentlemen's agreement for the second 
time (Shostak & Skocik, 1986). Once again, the FAA did not 
honor the terms agreed to with the controllers, this time 
resulting in a sickout that had nearly 3,000 participants. 
This action brought a severe response by the FAA, including 
the withholding of pay from controllers who called in sick 
and the issuing of subpoenas to each participating member. 
PATCO countered by enlisting the services of 50 attorneys to 
represent the controllers. The move to secure legal 
representation resulted in the nearly instantaneous 
bankruptcy of the union. Also, happening concurrently, was 
the filing of a lawsuit by the Air Transport Association 
(ATA) seeking $100 million because of losses it was suffering 
due to the decrease in air traffic services. Faced with 
overwhelming opposition and threats of his personal 
disbarment, F. Lee Bailey went on television, and under 
duress, called off the sickout (Shostak & Skocik, 1986). A 
federal judge involved with the case ruled that if PATCO ever 
"struck" again, it would be subject to fines of $25,000 or 
more to be paid to the ATA. The 'or more' portion of the 
previous sentence was to play an important role in the 
ultimate undoing of PATCO when the strike of 1981 happened 
and the government attached the contingency fund of nearly 
$3.5 million held by the union. 
Differences between PATCO and the FAA continued through 
the 1970s while PATCO was under the leadership of John 
Leyden. The decade was one of controversy for PATCO, 
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beginning with the resignation of F. Lee Bailey and ending 
with the replacement of Leyden in 1980. The departures of 
each of these leaders were emotionally charged and signaled 
directional changes for PATCO. Bailey resigned in June of 
1970, shortly after Leyden was chosen to lead the 
controllers. His leaving marked the end of the involvement 
of "non-controllers" in the determination of PATCO's future. 
The direction PATCO took in 1970 was toward that of a labor 
union rather than strictly that of a professional 
association. Through an affiliation with the Marine 
Engineer's Beneficial Association (MEBA), PATCO gained the 
alliance of a politically powerful association of 
professional workers as well as recognition as a labor union. 
With the MEBA affiliation, PATCO also acquired the insight 
and advise of Jesse Calhoun, the well respected leader of 
MEBA. PATCO, with assistance from MEBA, was soon able to 
become politically active and began its lobbying efforts with 
the endorsement of Richard Nixon for President in 1972. 
Nixon was successful in his bid for office and, in 1973, 
PATCO entered its first contractual negotiations with the FAA 
with the hopes of having a friend in the White House. With a 
membership of approximately 8,500 controllers, PATCO was only 
mildly optimistic as negotiations began. Optimism turned to 
elation when the union completed its first contract agreement 
and came away with what was felt to be a "first-ever contract 
more generous than the union had dared hope" (Shostak & 
Skocik, 1986, p. 63). As Leyden presided through the second 
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contract and into the third, it was beginning to become 
apparent that the "no-strike" clause which ultimately 
governed the response of government employees was adversely 
affecting the union's ability to negotiate. "By-the-book 
slowdowns" and controller "sick-outs" were the typical 
weapons employed when negotiating impasses were encountered. 
Occasionally, concessions sought by the union did not benefit 
all members within the union, and the effectiveness of these 
tactics was compromised when membership support was not 
sufficiently responsive. 
Included in the third contract was an expansion of 
Familiarization (FAM) privileges to international flights 
(FAM is the term used referring to the ability of a 
controller to fly in air carrier cockpits as an observer for 
the purpose of becoming better acquainted with pilot 
responsibilities.). This benefit was viewed by some air 
carriers as merely a perk and a number of them refused to 
honor the FAM flight requests. Seeing the FAM flights as the 
only gain of substance in 1978, Leyden tried to fight the 
denial of these flights by threatening an air traffic 
slowdown. Many of the controllers, however, did not see the 
FAM flights as a benefit worth initiating a job action for. 
Leyden continued his opposition to the cutting out of the FAM 
flights on the basis of the effect that conceding an already 
negotiated item would have on future contract negotiations. 
Leyden called for and got a slowdown to protest the reduction 
but the slowdown was not well supported and proved to be 
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ineffective. This issue, together with other problems facing 
PATCO such as wage classifications, controller stress rulings 
by the FAA, a second career training program, and in-house 
controller discontent, served to weaken Leyden's position as 
the union's leader. According to Shostak & Skocik (1986), 
the executive board of PATCO began to doubt whether Leyden's 
continued role as the leader of PATCO was in PATCO's best 
interest. The internal dissension continued through 1978 and 
1979 and into the election period of 1980 when Leyden was 
opposed by his Executive Vice President, Robert E. Poli. At 
a controversial meeting in January of 1980, both Poli and 
Leyden offered their resignations to the board. The board 
took a vote and in a 6 to 1 decision agreed to accept the 
resignation of Leyden and to ask Poli to remain as the new 
union president. 
Poli's presidency was to last only two years, but those 
two years were steeped in a new resolve and commitment to 
unity by the controller workforce. PATCO began to move more 
blatantly towards a showdown with the FAA. Rhetoric from 
both sides intensified while contract talks faltered. In 
October of 1980, Poli announced that PATCO would support 
Ronald Reagan for President. In return, Poli received a 
letter from Reagan which reads as follows: 
Dear Mr. Poli, 
I have been thoroughly briefed by members of my 
staff as to the deplorable state of our nation's air 
traffic control system. They have told me that too few 
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people working unreasonable hours with obsolete 
equipment has placed the nation's air travelers in 
unwarranted danger. In an area so clearly related to 
public safety, the Carter Administration has failed to 
act reasonably. 
You can rest assured that if I am elected 
President, I will take whatever steps are necessary to 
provide our air traffic controllers with the most 
modern equipment available, and to adjust staff levels 
and workdays so they are commensurate with achieving 
the maximum degree of public safety. 
As in all areas of the federal government where 
the President has the power of appointment, I fully 
intend to appoint highly qualified individuals who can 
work harmoniously with Congress and the employees of 
government agencies they oversee. 
I pledge to you that my administration will work 
very closely with you to bring about a spirit of 
cooperation between the President and the air traffic 
controllers. Such harmony can and must exist if we are 
to restore the people's confidence in the government. 
Sincerely, 
Ronald Reagan 
(Personal Correspondence, 1979) 
This letter served to bolster the confidence of the 
controllers and their leadership in the belief that their's 
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was a reasonable position that would have support from the 
highest level of government if Reagan were President. 
Poli had a list of 96 demands that were brought to the 
bargaining table. Of those, there were three that, according 
to Shostak & Skocik (1986) were revealed by controller 
questionnaires to be of the most concern. The other demands 
served to emphasize that there was much that would still need 
to be addressed. The three most significant concerns were 
those of salary gains, reduced work hours, and retirement 
aid. While progress was made on a number of issues, 
negotiating impasses remained. After many months of talks 
without an agreement and an already expired contract, the FAA 
was given notice by Poli that PATCO intended to begin a work 
stoppage on August 3, 1981, if a settlement could not be 
reached. Unfortunately, the talks did not produce an 
agreement between the parties and at 7:00 am on August 3, 
1981, nearly 13,000 controllers walked away from their 
positions, beginning an illegal strike. 
Many controllers felt that President Reagan would 
intervene in a way that would, because of his pledge, settle 
the dispute in an amiable way. Instead, Reagan issued an 
ultimatum to the controllers that if they did not return to 
their positions within a 48 hour period, they would be 
terminated. The controllers held steadfastly to their picket 
lines, and subsequently, the vast majority of the nation's 
controller workforce was fired. The strike also resulted in 
the bankruptcy of the union, the banning for life of its 
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members from working for the FAA as Air Traffic Controllers, 
and the ultimate destruction of the union through 
decertification efforts initiated by the government. 
Post Strikp. 
In 1989, approximately 5,000 working controllers 
responded to a questionnaire, with a majority of respondents 
stating that although the system remains safe, staffing is 
less than normal while the workload is often too heavy (Mead, 
1989). The goal for controller staffing has been set at 
18,300 (Anderson, 1991). Thanepohn (1991) has determined the 
1991 staffing level of air traffic controllers stood at 
17,284, of which 10,776 were considered full performance 
level (FPL), meaning they are certified to work at any 
position within a facility. These figures compare to 16,200 
controllers in 1981, and of that number, 13,205 were FPL 
controllers. These numbers represent a shortfall of nearly 
2,500 FPL controllers although the total number of 
controllers is more than 1,000 greater than in 1981. 
Staffing figures for the controller work force are also 
affected by problems in the way the Federal Aviation 
Administration (FAA) determines who controllers are, "These 
problems stem primarily from including persons who do not 
control air traffic in the controller work force and 
excluding others who do" (Peach, 1987, p. 1). 
The Air Line Pilots Association (ALPA) has shown concern 
that the level of FPL controllers is inadequate, given a 30% 
rise in air traffic volume over the past ten years. ALPA's 
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position had been one of reluctance to see fired controllers 
return to work. Now, ALPA cites that the 500-700 PATCO 
controllers who had returned to work through arbitration took 
no more than one year to reach the FPL level. ALPA also 
feels that enough of a penalty has been paid by fired 
controllers and they should be allowed the opportunity to 
reapply for their positions (Essler, 1991). In 1986, 
opinions were sought from working controllers and fired 
controllers regarding the rehiring issue. At that time, 57% 
of controllers working at the time of the strike and 69% of 
those hired since the strike opposed rehiring fired 
controllers, while 90% of the fired controllers responded 
that they would return to their positions if allowed 
(Mclure, 1986). 
Since that time, many of the working controller's 
opinions have changed to such a degree that NATCA called for 
the lifting of the ban on fired controllers at a convention 
in 1990 in a resolution directed to President Bush (Anderson, 
1990). NATCA had recently gone through its second election 
wherein Steve Bell was replaced by Barry Krasner as 
president, and Ray Spickler was replaced by Joe Bellino as 
vice president. This new leadership took its election as a 
mandate from the rank and file members to become more 
aggressive in their dealings with the Federal Aviation 
Administration (Ott, 1991). A prelude to this renewed 
increase in activism was the 1990 protest at the Washington 
Air Route Traffic Control Center (ARTCC) where picketing took 
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place to protest the lack of improvement since the strike, 
especially in the area of FPL controller staffing (Thanepohn, 
1991). Another example of controller dissatisfaction in 
working conditions was displayed when viewpoints were 
solicited from center controllers in the Chicago area (Mead, 
1989a). Additionally, a follow up to a 1985 survey was taken 
in 1988 to gauge changes in attitudes, "The 1988 perceptions 
of controllers, supervisors, and managers show little change 
since our 1985 survey. Whatever changes the FAA has made 
over the years, little overall movement in work force 
attitude has occurred." (Mead, 1989b, p. 9). 
The concerns of safety advocates such as the National 
Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) match those of NATCA, 
ALPA, and the FAA in what has been more than 13 years of 
debate regarding the safety, efficiency, and competence of 
the air traffic system. Training, automation, and equipment 
maintenance are among concerns affecting the controller's 
ability to perform. Training is costly and time consuming, 
with the screening phase at the Oklahoma training facility 
producing up to a 50% dropout rate. Steps are being 
implemented to shorten the selection time to five days or 
less in an effort to save time and money (Mead, 1990). 
Simulator training is being considered as a way to save money 
and relieve controllers from on-the-job training (OJT) 
responsibilities of new-hires (Carrigan, Eggenberger, & 
Gerstenfeld, 1992). Automation has encountered numerous 
delays in reaching its potential for controllers. Systems 
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proposed to be on-line in the late 1980s have yet to be 
installed, and according to Carlone (1990), the FAA may not 
have the required resources in terms of hardware and software 
in time to meet the increased demand on air traffic 
capabilities for the 1990s. Equipment maintenance problems 
account for 2% of the delays in the air traffic system. 
These problems were expected to be reduced with the advent of 
new equipment, however, equipment arrival delays have forced 
the FAA to re-think its position on maintenance staffing. 
The FAA had been relying on less demand for maintenance 
personnel by using highly efficient equipment in a plan to 
reduce the maintenance work force through attrition. Because 
the equipment has not been available, however, the FAA has 
found that there is now a shortage of these personnel. In 
order to keep pace with the demand on the system, the FAA is 
using increased overtime, incentives, and contractor services 
to help bolster the work force (Peach, 1991). 
Summary of Literature Review. 
The voices of those most affected by the strike, the 
fired controllers, have been relatively quiet during this 13 
year period. Given the condition of today's air traffic 
system and the fact that President Clinton lifted the ban on 
rehiring fired controllers, it is timely to examine the 
general perceptions of the terminated controllers regarding 
the actions they took at the time of the strike to determine 
if they see similar problems in today's air traffic control 
system. Bill Taylor, of "PATCO Lives", a support group and 
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publication for fired controllers, referring to the protest 
at the Washington Air Route Traffic Control Center (ARTCC) 
stated, "I felt compassion for them, because the system has 
come full circle. I thought of the irony of it and how well 
it proves that the issues of the strike have never been 
resolved" (Thanepohn, 1991, p. 23). 
Statement of the Hypothesis 
It is hypothesized that the beliefs, opinions, and 
perceptions of former PATCO members will suggest many of the 
key issues that led to the strike in 1981 are still 
unresolved and are, therefore, potential threats to the 
quality, safety, and efficiency of the current air traffic 
control system. Further, because of these beliefs and 
perceptions, the fired controllers will feel continued 
justification in their actions of 1981 although mitigated by 




The subjects for this study were derived from a 
population consisting of approximately 12,000 air traffic 
controllers who were terminated from their jobs for 
participating in a strike on August 3, 1981. The sample is 
comprised of former air traffic specialists who are members 
of PATCO Lives. PATCO Lives is an advocacy organization 
formed by fired controllers and their supporters shortly 
after the decertification and bankruptcy of the PATCO union. 
PATCO Lives is the only remaining cohesive link to the fired 
controller workforce and uses recorded phone messages and a 
newsletter to communicate with its nearly 3,000 members. The 
sample includes 380 respondents and represents a diverse 
segment of the total population of fired PATCO air 
traffic controllers. 
Instrument 
The instrument for this study is a questionnaire 
designed by the researcher to gauge respondent's opinions in 
a quantitative manner while allowing commentary input for 
supplemental analysis. This instrument, containing two 
parts, is designed to sample only air traffic controllers who 
23 
24 
were terminated from employment with the Federal Aviation 
Administration for participating in an illegal strike. Part 
1 is designed to gather demographic data while the second 
part provides information which permits evaluation of 
respondent's opinions through a structured question format. 
Space for respondent's comments provides for additional 
information to be used in analyzing generalizations relevant 
to the sample. 
The instrument was administered through the use of a 
mailing to the subjects. Scoring of the data in this study 
requires simple statistical processing by percentage value to 
apply the data from the sample to the population for 
quantitative results. Interpretation of comments harvested 
through this survey was completed by the researcher and 
reviewed by Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University faculty 
familiar with air traffic control and the situation at the 
time of the strike. 
Design 
The research for this study concentrates on the opinions 
of a sample of former air traffic controllers taken from a 
population of those controllers terminated from their 
positions in 1981 for participating in an illegal strike. 
The most appropriate way to accomplish this research is the 
descriptive method as depicted in the textbook, Educational 
Research, by Gay (1992). Chosen for its emphasis on the 
current status of the subjects and the opinionnaire data 
collection method, the descriptive method allows for a 
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comprehensive compilation and analysis of data which is best 
suited to determining a true consensus of controller 
opinions. The historical method described in this textbook, 
Educational Research, by Gay (1992), is used to provide an 
account of the pre-strike circumstances contributing to the 
breakdown of negotiations and the onset of the strike. Use 
of the correlational method, also outlined in the textbook 
Educational Research, by Gay (1992), provides the researcher 
with data upon which pertinent conclusions regarding fired 
controller attitudes may be drawn. 
Procedures 
To begin this study, the researcher presents a 
historical overview of the development of American unionism 
followed by the origin and growth of the PATCO union. The 
purpose of this information is to provide the reader with an 
understanding of the events leading to this study. The study 
investigates the attitudes of the air traffic controllers who 
were terminated for participating in the PATCO strike 
of 1981. 
The sample is taken from the population of fired air 
traffic controllers who are members of, or accessible by, 
PATCO Lives. The sample consists of approximately 10% of the 
target population which is an acceptable sample size. The 
sample was obtained through a newsletter mailing provided by 
PATCO Lives, a support group for fired controllers, and the 
only remaining link to the fired controller population. 
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The instrument, designed by the researcher for this 
study, consists of an opinionnaire and a statement to 
respondents requesting they complete and return the 
opinionnaire. The opinionnaire is in two parts, with five 
demographically oriented questions in the first part and nine 
structured questions for quantitative analysis in the second 
part. Available commentary space allows increased 
qualitative analysis of the data in the second part. The 
opinionnaire provides instructions for completion, assurance 
of anonymity, and a request for response within 14 days. 
There was no pretest, and because the instrument is unique to 
this study, it was not pre-validated. To ensure content 
validity, the researcher solicited a former controller to 
review and critique the instrument. 
CHAPTER 3 
Analysis 
Opinionnaire Part 1 - Demographic Analysis 
The questions in Part 1 of the opinionnaire (Appendix 
J), with the exception of question 5, were designed to 
present results in an illustrative manner. This demographic 
data provides information which allows the reader to envision 
the comprehensive depth of the sample in terms relative to 
the responses given to the structured questions in Part 2 of 
the opinionnaire. Review of the demographic and occupational 
data in Part 1 also provides the reader, who may or may not 
be familiar with the breadth of the PATCO strike, a basis of 
understanding regarding the scope of this national strike and 
its participants. The questions in Part 1 deal with the 
longevity, facility level, facility type, and facility 
location of the respondent at the time of the strike. 
Additionally, the respondent's employment status was included 
in the responses. 
1. How long were von employed bv the Federal Aviation 
Administration as an air traffic control specialist? 
Question 1, Part 1, asks how long the respondent was 
employed by the FAA. The results of this question are shown 
in graph form in Figure 1, In analyzing these results, a 
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Figure 1. Part 1, Question 1. How long were you employed 
by the Federal Aviation Administration as an air traffic 
control specialist? 
clear majority is evident in the combined time frames of 5-
10 years and 10-15 years. These two time frames comprise 
nearly 70% of the entire sample. This information is 
significant, in that it represents the most experienced 
segment of the air traffic control system in 1981. While it 
is recognized that individuals progress in training at 
varying speeds, the typical advancement of a controller from 
a newly hired developmental to a full performance level (FPL) 
controller requires approximately three to five years. The 
time to reach FPL is longer in complex facilities consisting 
of many positions at which the controller must become 
proficient. The 69.6% of the sample represented by the 5-10 
and 10-15 year categories represents a highly experienced 
contingent of former controllers. 
The former controllers represented by the three 
remaining time frames are divided nearly equally above and 
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below the majority segments with 14.2% in the 0-5 year 
category and 16.2% in the combined 15-20 year and "other" 
category. The "other" category consists of those controllers 
who had more than twenty years of service with the FAA. It 
is of interest to note that the respondent with the most 
years service had been employed by the FAA for twenty-seven 
years as an Air Traffic Controller. 
In terms of controller expertise, this question clearly 
shows that the vast majority of respondents had five or more 
years experience, with only 14.2% having less. Indeed, 54.3% 
of all respondents had ten or more years experience 
controlling air traffic. 
2. What level of facility were you assigned to at the time 
of the strike? 
Question 2, Part 1, asks what level facility the 
respondent was assigned to at the time of the strike. Air 
traffic facilities are rated according to the density and 
complexity of the air traffic handled, on a scale of one to 
five. A level 1 facility, as an example, is typically a non-
radar, VFR (visual flight rules) control tower which is 
minimally staffed and has relatively few aircraft operations. 
Many of these facilities have, since the strike, been given 
by the FAA via contract to private air traffic companies in 
an attempt to make better use of the limited supply of 
personnel resources. Those controllers involved were moved 
to busier sites to help bolster staffing deficiencies left by 
the strike. 
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Level 2, 3 and 4 facilities carry increasing degrees of 
complexity and traffic density, and include facilities such 
as busier towers controlling non-radar approaches, radar 
approach control facilities (RAPCONS), and terminal radar 
approach control facilities (TRACONS). A level 5 facility is 
responsible for the most complex and heavy air traffic and is 
usually reserved for air route traffic control centers 
(ARTCC) and TRACONS such as those located at large 
metropolitan airports. The level associated with each 
facility is designated by the FAA and is also used as a 
criteria which determines the pay levels attainable by 
employees, according to government pay grades (i.e., a GS-7 
pay grade for a level one facility versus a GS-14 pay grade 
for a level 5 facility). 
The graph in Figure 2 shows very similar percentage 
values associated with the level 3, 4, and 5 facilities, 
while the level 1 and 2 facilities are likewise similar, 
albeit approximately 10% less than the level 3, 4, and 5. 
The result for the level 1 and 2 facilities was expected to 
be proportionately lower, as it is, due to the lesser 
manpower requirements connected to the facility size. These 
results, together with the results for the level 3, 4, and 5 
facilities demonstrate, by their parity, an excellent cross 
section of former controllers by facility level is 
represented by the sample. The 15.5% of respondents in the 
"other" category are those former controllers who could not 
recall at what level their facility was designated. Of those 
31 
FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION 
FACILITY LEVEL 
LEVEL 2 (8.7%) 
<dr^ 
LEVEL 1 (11.1%) « » 
• ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ |jl, | ^  |j|m 
| N ^ ^ 
OTHER ( 1 5 . 5 % ) \ W^B 
LEVEL 5 (21.0%) 
f l $ ^ ^ ^ _ L E V E L 3 (22.4%) 
j l jk / LEVEL 4 (21.3%) 
/ 
Figure 2. Part 1, Question 2. What level of facility 
were you assigned to at the time of the strike? 
respondents who could not recall which rating their facility 
held, the majority indicated they were assigned to an ARTCC, 
or to a facility which was deemed to be among the busiest. 
Some were confused as to whether a level 1 or a level 5 
facility was rated busiest. Assumptions were not made on 
this point, thus accounting for the 15.5% figure. It could 
be reasonably expected, however, according to the 
respondent's comments, that the 15.5% would follow the same 
pattern as the 3, 4, and 5 facilities, with a possible slant 
toward the facilities rated at level 4 and 5. 
3. What typp of facility were vou assigned to? 
Question 3, Part 1, inquired as to the type facility the 
respondent was working in prior to the 1981 strike. The 
three most common facility types include control towers, 
TRACONS, and ARTCCS (referred to as centers). While 97.1% of 
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Figure 3. Part 1, Question 3. What type of facility were 
you assigned to? 
the sample responded within these three categories, there 
remained 2.9% who were associated with facility types such as 
United States Armed Forces Radar Approach Control Facilities 
(RAPCONS), Terminal Radar Approach Control In Tower Cab 
(TRACABS), and Combined Center-RAPCON (CERAPS), see Figure 3. 
The results of this demographic question serve to 
reaffirm the validity of the comprehensive nature of the 
sample. There is a 3.4% difference in the pie graph 
segments of Figure 3 representing TRACONS and centers, 
proving analogous to the results of Question 2 in Part 1 
regarding levels 3, 4, and 5 facilities. Tower facilities 
are represented by 21% of the sample which is comparable to 
the Level 1 and 2 facilities of Question 2 in Part 1 of the 
opinionnaire, accounting for 19.8% of the sample. Again, 
most typical Level 1 and 2 towers are staffed with a minimum 
number of controllers, and the disparity between the 21% 
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segment shown in Figure 3 and those representing TRACONS and 
centers is attributable to this lesser staffing requirement. 
4. In which state was the facility located? 
The information obtained from Question 4 of Part 1 of 
the opinionnaire lends further credence in assuring the 
sample is representative of a comprehensive, yet diverse 
cross section of the population of former air traffic 
controllers. As shown by the map depicted in Figure 4, it is 
readily apparent that nearly every state in the country is 
represented by the sample. 
The map in Figure 4 also indicates where concentrations 
of former controllers may be found. These areas are evident 
in two ways. First, it would appear that the larger and more 
populous states have the greatest number of respondents. 
States like Texas, New York, California, and Florida are 
examples of large, heavily populated states. While this is 
true to a certain degree, another factor relative to 
concentrated pockets of former controllers would be the 
locations of ARTCC facilities. Included are states like New 
Hampshire, Ohio, Colorado, and Minnesota with comparatively 
high numbers of respondents. One may see a correlation 
between the two, but not all the states having ARTCCs are 
necessarily heavily populated ones. 
The demographic information provided by the first four 
questions in Part 1 of the opinionnaire is of importance to 
the results of this study. The intent of the study is to 
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Figure 4. Part 1, Question 4. In which state was the 
facility located? 
determine a consensus opinion of fired air traffic 
controllers. To do so requires a sample truly representative 
of the population of those controllers fired from their 
profession. These demographic questions were designed as a 
method of validating that the sample being used is comprised 
of respondents whose responses would not be skewed by the 
parameters of longevity, facility level, facility type, or 
geographic location. 
All four questions, when taken individually, instill a 
degree of confidence in the validity of the sample. When 
they are considered collectively, however, there is no doubt 
that the sample is well rounded and an exemplar of the 
population. Had any of the four questions revealed an 
obvious and unqualified disparity in its results, such as all 
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responding controllers being from the same geographic region, 
or all from the same type facility, the conclusions of this 
study may have been compromised by that bias toward only a 
very particular portion of the population. If this were the 
case, that circumstance might have rendered continuation of 
the study suspect to critical analysis. The sample does, 
however, prove to be valid by the parameters of the questions 
in Part 1 of the opinionnaire. Also, as mentioned earlier, 
this information additionally serves to provide the reader 
with a basis of understanding regarding the breadth of those 
individuals involved in the 1981 strike. 
5. What is your current occupation? 
Contributing to the reader's perception of those 
controllers involved in the strike are the results taken from 
Question 5 of Part 1 which asks the current occupation of the 
respondent. This question is relevant in a number of ways. 
For example, the positions held now by the former controllers 
may be indicative of the type of positions expected to be 
attainable by the FAA controllers currently working who lose 
their jobs by medical disqualification or other reasons. The 
positions now being held by former controllers also allow 
conclusions to be drawn regarding how the skills of an air 
traffic control specialist do, or do not, transfer to the 
private sector. 
Appendix K lists many of the occupations the former 
controllers were involved with at the time the opinionnaire 
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was disseminated. For the purpose of this study, the 
occupations were categorized, to the extent possible, to be 
compared to those which were solicited in a 1984 study by 
Steven O'Keefe. By approaching the question in this manner, 
it is possible to see if there were any progressive or 
regressive trends in the employment of the former 
controllers. The eight categories used by O'Keefe and their 
corresponding values are shown in Table 2. 
The occupations exhibiting the greatest change since the 
1984 study are the 11.7% increase in the "Professional" 
category and the 9.6% decrease in the "Sales" category. It 
should be noted at this point, that the comparisons and 
conclusions regarding the information in Table 2 cannot be 
Table 2. 
Occupations Held by Former Controllers 


































qualified scientifically in this study due to the fact that 
the sample used in the O'Keefe study was not available for 
use and is therefore not known to the researcher beyond its 
results. The information is relative, however, and does 
indicate that generally the former controllers appear to be 
making progress in advancing in their new vocations. For 
example, the percentage of those in sales positions following 
the strike may indicate that sales was one of the areas where 
jobs were more obtainable at the onset of the strike. Since 
the strike was more than 13 years ago and many controllers 
are now involved in completely new endeavors, the increase 
in the "Professional" and "Management" categories would, as 
in normal career development, indicate expected advancement 
over an extended period of time. 
The variance in the White Collar and Blue Collar 
categories suggest a generic shift in the workforce prevalent 
in recent years where focus has been placed on downsizing, 
restructuring, and reductions in the ranks of middle 
management. The decreases in the categories of "Self 
Employed" and "ATC Here and Abroad" are small and do not 
appear to be significant. Similarly, the 2.4% increase in 
the "Unemployed" category, while not significantly large, may 
be due to the economic recession experienced in the past few 
years. Again, while not entirely scientific in nature, this 
information is generally acceptable and is presented to 
further appraise the reader of characteristics of the sample 
prior to the analysis of the questions in Part 2 of 
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the opinionnaire. 
Opinionnaire Part 2 - Quantitative/Qualitative Analysis 
The questions in Part 2 of the opinionnaire, with the 
exception of Question 9, were designed in a manner allowing 
the respondent to provide concise, quantifiable responses. 
In addition, each question offered space for the respondent 
to comment on his/her answer. This feature was the vehicle 
that furnished qualifiable information pertaining to the 
consensus sentiment of the sample. Question 9 was not a 
quantifiable question, but did solicit a qualifiable answer 
regarding concerns the respondents may have in returning to 
the ATC profession. 
The results of Part 2 of the opinionnaire are presented 
in two ways. The first relates the findings of the 
quantifiable portion of the question. This is accomplished 
by percentage values depicted in bar graph form, providing 
consistency as well as ease in visual discernment for the 
reader. The second way the results are presented is by 
relating a compilation of the qualifiable information taken 
from the comment section of the respondent's answers. 
Determination of the responses of greatest frequency and 
commonality within each question enables a complementary 
perspective to be developed. This perspective is crucial in 
ascertaining beliefs truly representative of the sample. 
Quoted examples of responses made by the former controllers 
for each question are highlighted in Appendices A through I. 
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1• When the strike began, did you feel it was a justifiable 
cause? 
Based on the fact that this question was asked of people 
who went out on strike, remained on strike in the face of a 
presidential ultimatum, and were subsequently fired, it was 
expected that a majority of respondents would reply in the 
affirmative. While the majority did reply as expected, see 
Figure 5, an underlying intent of the question was to gauge 
the level of respondents who answered in the negative and 
determine the reasons behind their decision to participate in 
the strike. As Figure 5 shows, 87% of respondents answered 
YES, 12% answered NO, and less than 1% did not respond. 
The 87% that answered YES cited a variety of reasons to 
support the position they took. The issues of equipment, 
safety, and staffing were predominant, while secondary 
issues such as the feeling that there was no choice but to 
strike and union loyalty also impacted the controllers 
decisions. In justifying the "No Choice" response, comments 
included fears of the lack of long term survivability 
working as an air traffic controller, a belief that there had 
been a "set-up" on the part of the FAA to destroy the union, 
and the belief that the FAA did not negotiate in good faith, 
thereby forcing the strike to happen. Regarding union 
loyalty, it is of interest to note that there were very few 
comments from controllers claiming peer pressure as a reason 
for participating in the strike. Others who had answered YES 
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Figure 5. Part 2, Question 1. When the strike began, did 
you feel it was a justifiable cause? 
methodology chosen by PATCO to fight the FAA by striking was 
wrong, as was the time chosen to enact it. Although they 
harbored misgivings, these controllers nonetheless went on 
strike in support of their union and co-workers. 
Of the 12% of the respondents who answered in the 
negative, nine stated that they had no reason to go on 
strike, believing things were good for them as they were. 
Some of these people went out on strike in support of the 
union, but expressed reservations or fear of reprisal if they 
had not. The fear refers to the idea that, if the strike had 
been successful, the union or individuals within the union 
would retaliate against a member who did not support the 
strike effort. It is of importance to realize that, in air 
traffic control, controllers are responsible for the on-the-
job training of other controllers. The potential exists for 
a controller holding ill will towards another controller to 
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seriously impede the training and progressive checkout of 
that person through the various positions within a facility-
Checking out at all required positions is the way controllers 
advance to the full performance level at a given facility. 
If a controller is found to be unable to qualify for the 
positions at his/her facility, consequences may include 
delays in monetary upgrades, reassignment to a lesser 
facility, or in worst case scenarios, the potential 
for dismissal. 
The 12% figure attached to the negative answers 
represents the opinions of 46 controllers out of the sample 
of 380. In addition to the reasons mentioned, some fired 
controllers stated their discomfort with the legal issue of 
striking against the U. S. Government and breaking a personal 
oath. Others felt they had been misinformed and/or misled by 
either the FAA or the PATCO union and may have acted 
differently if they had been better appraised of all the 
circumstances involved. Another sentiment expressed was for 
alternative actions to the strike, similar to the slowdowns 
and sickouts PATCO had effectively employed in the past. 
There were a multitude of individual feelings, the most 
common of which have been discussed above. A point of 
interest worth noting is, when the strike began, much 
attention had been given to the union demand of a $10,000 
raise. Of the responses received, there was a negligible 
number of respondents who named money as a concern. The 
issues of inadequate equipment and related safety problems 
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are indicated by the respondents as having been the paramount 
concerns for them in determining their decision to strike was 
a justifiable cause. 
2. In retrospect, do you now feel the strike was 
justified? 
This question serves as the primary focus of this study 
in determining the correctness of the hypothesis. The 
hypothesis states that there would be a continued feeling of 
justification on the part of the fired controllers for their 
actions in 1981, however, their perceptions of justification 
would be mitigated by the losses they suffered. Figure 6 
clearly indicates, after more than 13 years, the fired 
controllers maintain a conviction of justification in their 
decision to participate in the PATCO strike. The percentage 
of controllers who answered in the negative supports, in 
part, expectations that their belief the strike was justified 
is mitigated by their losses. The comments made by the 
former controllers further enhance the premise of their sense 
of loss. 
A comparison between Figure 5 and Figure 6 reflects 
nearly a 16% increase in those controllers who, in 
retrospect, do not feel the PATCO strike was justified. The 
number of respondents who answered NO to this question is 
106. Some of the more common responses of those 
controllers included twenty-one who stated that, in 
hindsight, they no longer felt their actions were justified, 
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Figure 6. Part 2, Question 2. In retrospect, do you now 
feel the strike was justified? 
felt their efforts had been in vain, and five who believed 
the financial and emotional costs had been too high. 
The respondents who answered YES, in many cases, did so 
emphatically using terms such as "absolutely", "100%", and 
"Now more than ever!". Twenty-one indicated they still felt 
complete justification in what they did. Eight respondents 
believed there was no choice except to strike, five related 
that what they knew to be legally wrong, was the morally 
right thing to do, and three others termed the strike a set-
up. Again, as in the first question of this part of the 
study, there were numerous other responses expressing 
personal thoughts and emotions. 
One of the more common responses received on both sides 
of this question stated the PATCO controllers wish that 
things had been done differently, with emphasis on the point 
that they should have stayed on the job and attempted to 
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change conditions from within. The responses generally 
conveyed a feeling of pride the former controllers had in 
their conviction to support what they believed in regardless 
of the subsequent personal losses experienced. The losses 
extend beyond the obvious loss of a career to include long 
term friendships with controllers who opted not to strike, 
deaths of fellow strikers by suicide, the loss of family 
because of divorces induced by strike related stress, and job 
skills which have few private sector applications. These 
examples and others the respondents express throughout Part 2 
of the opinionnaire are representative of some of the burdens 
the fired controllers feel they have been forced to bear 
since the onset of the strike. 
3. Do you feel the government had any viable alternative to 
terminating you after the 48 hour return to work 
ultimatum was issued? 
The responses received for this question indicate an 
indomitable belief on the part of the fired controllers that 
the strike could have been averted had alternative 
opportunities been pursued by the government. As the graph 
in Figure 7 illustrates, 85.5% of the PATCO controllers felt 
the government had choices available short of terminating 
their employment. The response most frequently cited 
communicated the idea that the fired controllers believed the 
government should have negotiated in good faith. This 
particular response represented the opinions of 17.9% of the 
respondents. This response, when considered conversely, 
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implies the former controllers feel the government failed to 
negotiate in good faith throughout the talks leading to 
the strike. 
Of the other responses pertaining to the YES side of 
this question, two had relatively high frequencies. The 
first being that both sides should have submitted to binding 
arbitration to settle the unresolved issues. These 
respondents felt that a mediator, holding no bias towards 
either side, would have presented the best opportunity for a 
resolution acceptable to both parties. The second response 
advocated a cooling off period to allow the tension of the 
strike to subside and cooler heads to prevail. 
Another commonly echoed sentiment was that the 4 8 hour 
ultimatum issued by President Reagan was inappropriate given 
the gravity of the situation the strike presented, and the 
consequences that eventually came from it. Additional 
alternatives recommended by the respondents included the 
possibilities of suspensions without pay and/or the levying 
of fines. 
The PATCO controllers also believe they were wrongly 
denied the opportunity to reapply for their positions after a 
three year penalty, prescribed by law, had expired. They 
felt the refusal to accept applications after the three 
years had passed added a vindictive quality to the ultimatum 
which stated the controllers would never be allowed to work 
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Figure 7 _ Part 2, Question 3. Do you feel the government 
had any viable alternative to terminating you after the 48 
hour return to work ultimatum was issued? 
person terminated from a governmental position has the right 
to be reconsidered for that position after a three year 
period has passed, but President Reagan chose at the time to 
disqualify the controllers from working air traffic control 
for the FAA for life. There is, concurrent with the 
compilation of this study, a court case addressing the issue 
of the three year rule. Fired controllers who attempted to 
reapply after the three year period ended in 1984, together 
with the others who did not, are represented in this case. 
On the other side of this question, 13.7% of the 
responding controllers answered NO. The most popular reason 
given for the NO response was the thought that President 
Reagan had painted himself into a corner by issuing the 48 
hour ultimatum as he did in a Rose Garden news conference. 
These respondents feel the President had left himself without 
47 
a face-saving way out of the situation once the time limit 
had been set and with no option other than to carry out the 
threat he made. Some of the respondents also felt another 
consideration was that the President had no choice but to 
fire the controllers due to pending negotiations with postal 
workers and the potential for a labor action by that group. 
As the PATCO job action was the President's first serious 
confrontation with a federal labor organization since his 
inauguration, a determined show of strength on the part of 
the government was perceived as necessary. Indications were, 
that if control of the broader picture of labor in general 
was to be maintained, the controllers would have to be made 
examples of. 
4. Do you feel the ATC system has recovered to an 
acceptable level of safety and efficiency? 
When Question 4 was developed, it was intended to be a 
cut-and-dry YES or NO question. Analysis of the data 
received, however, indicated that a number of respondents 
felt the question considered two separate concerns, safety 
and efficiency.- rather than as a combination. To express 
their opinions, some respondents either checked both the YES 
and NO boxes, or did not check any box. For the purpose of 
accommodating these opinions, the responses were classified 
together with those of the No Answer category. Figure 8 
shows those who responded with both answers or no answer 
represents 10.5% of the sample, or 40 respondents. There 
were 14 responses indicating that in terms of safety, the 
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system has recovered, while in terms of efficiency it has 
not. Others who did not answer the question commented they 
were now too far removed from the industry to render a 
knowledgeable response. 
Figure 8 indicates 70.8% of the sample believes the ATC 
system has not recovered from the effects of the PATCO 
strike. Supporting the negative response, there were three 
responses which were common. The most popular of the three 
was partially dependent upon second hand knowledge, meaning 
that according to people the respondents know who are 
working in the industry, and exposed to the ATC system, 
problems prevalent before the strike continue to hinder air 
traffic in today's system. 
The second most common response concerned the efficiency 
level of the current system. The sample's responses point to 
flow control delays and fifteen mile in-trail restrictions 
contributing to an inefficient operation. Flow control 
refers to the monitoring of air traffic arriving, departing, 
or traversing areas typically burdened with excessive amounts 
of air traffic. Flow control takes into account the amount 
of anticipated traffic, weather conditions, runway usage, and 
other variables in a decision making process which dictates 
to the affected areas how much air traffic is permissible 
under the given conditions. These decisions affect the users 
of the system when the level set by flow control does not 
meet that requested by the users. The result is the issuance 
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Figure 8. Part 2, Question 4. Do you feel the ATC system 
has recovered to an acceptable level of safety and 
efficiency? 
receive a clearance for a flight plan to become active. The 
difference between the user's originally requested time and 
that given through flow control constitutes the delay the 
user will incur. Fifteen miles in-trail is the distance one 
aircraft must remain behind another to maintain current safe 
separation standards. Some of the subjects stated that in-
trail restrictions relegated the controller to a position of 
being an air traffic monitor rather than an air 
traffic controller. 
The third most common response referred to the number of 
full performance level (FPL) controllers now working the 
system versus the pre-strike level. Thirteen respondents 
were of the opinion the number of FPLs remains below 
acceptable levels to efficiently handle the current volume of 
air traffic. 
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Referring again to Figure 8, 18.7% of the respondents 
believe the air traffic control system has recovered from the 
strike. Many of the respondents answering YES to this 
question did so without comment. Those who did comment 
seemed to only grudgingly accept their answer by adding 
qualifying remarks such as references to the "Big Sky" 
theory, or citing the lack of major crashes involving 
controller error as the criteria on which their answer was 
based. The "Big Sky" theory is a common aviation reference 
to the idea that there is so much air space available that 
the odds of any two aircraft being at the same place at the 
same time are very low. Therefore, the probability of a 
collision is relatively low even without the presence of the 
air traffic controllers. 
Of the 380 respondents included in this study, 12% or 47 
of them are currently involved in aviation and have exposure 
to the current ATC system. Eleven respondents are pilots, 
three of whom believe the system has recovered while eight do 
not. Other respondents who work in the industry include six 
who now work in airport operations, three who are employed as 
aeronautical information specialists, and twenty-seven who 
are involved in air traffic control. Those involved in air 
traffic control include twelve who control air traffic for 
the Department of Defense, three who now control air traffic 
in a foreign country, and twelve who are employed by private 
air traffic control companies. 
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5. Do you feel the current ATC workforce has benefitted by 
your sacrifice, in terms of overall working conditions? 
The data received for Question 5 of Part 2 reveals that 
the former air traffic controllers are nearly equally divided 
in their opinion of whether or not the present controllers 
are better off now because of the PATCO strike. As Figure 9 
shows, 46.6% of the respondents believe the present 
controllers have benefitted by the PATCO controllers 
actions, while 43.1% feel they have not. Thirty-nine 
controllers, or 10.2%, did not answer the question. 
The most popular answer of those holding the YES opinion 
referred to the increases in pay and benefits the current 
controllers have received since 1981. A number of 
respondents cited specific salary differences as a reason 
for their YES answer. One such response placed the yearly 
salary for a GS-14 step 4 position in 1981 at $42,000, versus 
the same position in 1992 receiving $70,000. The validity of 
the comparison was not verified due to the fact that the 
comment solicited by the opinionnaire was taken at face 
value as being true to the feelings of the individual 
respondent. There were other comparisons as well, but the 
point was made that the former controllers feel substantial 
monetary gains have been realized by the controllers now 
working for the FAA. Other benefits mentioned include pay 
differentials for controllers while they are performing on-
the-job training for other controllers. Also, incentives are 
in place for those who work at facilities traditionally 
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Figure 9. Part 2, Question 5. Do you feel the current 
ATC workforce has benefitted by your sacrifice, in terms 
of overall working conditions? 
difficult to staff because of the volume and complexity of 
the traffic managed at such sites. Several respondents 
summed up their sentiments by lamenting that the current 
controllers now have what the PATCO controllers had 
asked for. 
The former controllers who answered NO to this question 
generally felt there had been negligible change during the 
past thirteen years. In particular, they believe the 
autocratic management style which pervaded the system in 1981 
remains intact and unresponsive. Fifteen controllers (3.9%) 
stated their view that conditions had actually worsened for 
the controllers now working. Supporting the belief 
conditions had worsened since 1981, these controllers pointed 
to present controllers working more traffic with fewer FPLs 
and with an average skill level significantly below that of 
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1981. Others expressed their hopes that the working 
conditions in the FAA had improved, but were skeptical that 
they had. 
6. If the ban on rehiring was lifted, would you have 
reapplied for your position? 
Question 6 of Part 2 asked the respondent to answer the 
question in each of four time frames. The time frames 
include the periods from 1 month to 3 years, 3 years to 7 
years, 7 years to 11 years, and now, (Now refers to the time 
the opinionnaire was received by the respondent). The 
purpose of the question was to gauge if, when, and to what 
degree, the members of the sample would resign themselves to 
the eventual end of their endeavor to regain employment with 
the FAA. 
Referring to Figure 10, it is evident that when the 
strike began, and for the first three years following the 
strike, the vast majority (92.1%) of the controllers would 
have reapplied for their positions, if allowed. This three 
year period includes the time used to complete the appeal 
process attempted by much of the fired controller population, 
while hopes remained high for a negotiated settlement. As 
time passed through the second time frame to the seventh year 
after the strike, there was nearly a 10% drop in the number 
of controllers who would have opted to reapply to work air 
traffic. The largest drop, 14.7%, came between the second 
and third time frames which extends to elevten years after 
the strike. 
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Figure 10. Part 2, Question 6. If the ban on rehiring 
was lifted, would you have reapplied for your position? 
The reasons given for the decline in the number of 
controllers who would reapply to the FAA are many. There 
are, however, three reasons which stand out among the others. 
The first is that a lot of time has passed and the 
controllers have begun new careers. These controllers are 
satisfied in their new vocations and would not risk their 
current positions, or cause renewed family upheaval in an 
unguaranteed attempt to become a controller again. Secondly, 
a number of controllers believe their advanced age would 
adversely affect their ability to be rehired. Third, some 
controllers expressed reservations regarding the current 
status of their health and the prospects of being able to 
pass the required physical examination. 
Interestingly, the final time frame which asks if the 
respondent would reapply now produced an increase from 67.9% 
to 74.7%, with 94.7% of the respondents participating in this 
55 
portion of the question. These figures not only show a 
slowing in the rate of decline in interest in reapplying, but 
a 6.8% increase in those who would reapply. It is surmised 
that the change in the trend developing in Figure 10 is 
attributable solely to the fact that as the opinionnaires 
were being disseminated, President Clinton lifted the banned-
for-life penalty imposed upon the controllers in the fall of 
1993 and granted them the opportunity to reapply for 
employment with the FAA. The lifting of the ban by President 
Clinton has rekindled a spark of hope for those controllers 
who still wish to return to the ATC profession. 
Proof of the amount of interest created by the action of 
President Clinton has been indicated by the thousands of 
applications the FAA has received from former PATCO members. 
The number of applicants continues to rise, although at the 
time of this writing, no fired controllers have been rehired 
through this initiative. Presently, there is a hiring freeze 
in effect, but attempts are being made by PATCO Lives and 
other groups to secure increased staffing appropriations to 
expedite the rehiring of former PATCO members. 
An observation regarding the steadfast determination of 
the sample respondents was made obvious during the analysis 
of the data for this question. As the tallies were 
completed, it was noted that 60.3% of the controllers had 
indicated they would have reapplied for their former 
positions for all the time frames since the strike began. It 
has been more than 13 years since the controllers lost their 
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jobs, but the desire to do what they feel they do the best 
remains a passionate goal. Contrasting this 60.3% figure 
with the 1.5% who responded that they would not have 
reapplied with the FAA at any time since the strike, one can 
sense how deep the sentiments of these controllers run. An 
example of the depth of feeling retained by some of the 
controllers is evidenced by the statements of two 
controllers. One stated, "I loved the profession and gave my 
life to it". The other said, "I miss my profession...ATC is 
what I am". As is the case with the other questions in Part 
2 of the opinionnaire, a compilation of quoted responses for 
both sides of the questions is included in Appendix F. 
7. Do you feel animosity would be an issue if PATCO 
controllers returned to the ATC system? 
The issue of animosity, examined by this question, is 
one which must be dealt with by employees who have been 
involved in a strike, then returned to work with those who 
did not participate in or agree with the job action. 
Retribution has historically been a problem in emotionally 
charged strikes where some employees support the issues and 
others do not. This is especially the case when those who 
did not support the action benefit because of those who did. 
If PATCO controllers were reintegrated into the ATC system, 
it would be naive to assume there would be no harboring of 
animosity. It is with this thought in mind that Question 7 
was asked. The feelings of the fired air traffic 
controllers, 13 years after the event, may reveal whether 
57 
emotions have calmed, or assist in determining to what extent 
precautions may be necessary if the controllers return to the 
FAA in substantial numbers. 
Figure 11 illustrates the results received. Based 
solely on the depiction of the graph in this figure, the 
indication would be that the majority of PATCO controllers do 
not believe that animosity would be an issue if they were to 
return to the FAA. The comments accompanying the YES/NO 
answers, however, tend to moderate this majority to a certain 
degree. For example, a number of the controllers who 
answered NO go on to make statements such as, "No, at least 
not on my part". While the quantitative indication is NO, a 
fair assumption would suggest that the potential for 
animosity related problems exists, albeit not a blatant one. 
Nineteen controllers answered in this manner. 
Twenty-five controllers responded that there would be 
some animosity- These controllers were inclined to chose the 
wording of their responses carefully, alluding that animosity 
would be on the part of others and not themselves. Another 
22 respondents said if any ill will were evidenced, it would 
come from FAA management, not the returning controllers. The 
inference drawn from the controller's comments is that more 
controllers than represented in Figure 11 believe there would 
be some amount of animosity, but the controllers would not be 
the party responsible for initiating it. 
Throughout the 13 years since the strike, the issue of 
animosity has been brought up each time the possibility of 
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Figure 11. Part 2, Question 7. Do you feel animosity 
would be an issue if PATCO controllers returned to the ATC 
system? 
reinstatement or reapplying was discussed. The graph in 
Figure 11, while indicating 76.5% of the controllers do not 
feel there would be an animosity issue, also shows 18.6% who 
believe there would be. The degree to which this percentage 
of controllers would be participants in any acts to 
demonstrate those feelings cannot be determined. 
Furthermore, it should be noted that no response specifically 
proposed or advocated any adverse actions, rather there was 
the generalized thought that someone other than the 
respondent would be the holder of any ill will. 
Further analysis of the responses reflect the varied 
sentiments held by the controllers. Twelve felt that too 
much time had elapsed for there to be continued sensitivity 
in this matter. Several controllers remarked that they were 
professionals, and as such would put personal feelings aside 























so few people remaining who were working in 1981 that the 
question is moot. The fired controllers do not appear to 
hold any feelings of animosity towards the people who have 
been hired since the strike, recognizing they were simply 
seizing an employment opportunity presented by the FAA. Only 
six PATCO respondents specifically mentioned their disdain 
for strike breaking controllers they have labeled as "scabs" 
or "sprinters". 
Considering the quantitative results together with the 
qualifying comments, the consensus opinion of the PATCO 
controllers regarding the animosity issue can be summarized 
as follows. The controllers generally feel that animosity 
will not prove to be an issue if they are returned to their 
former positions. This is not to say that there will not be 
isolated areas where evidence of animosity arises. There are 
still strong feelings among individuals within the sample 
such as those who feel they were wronged by the FAA and the 
President and have not completely reconciled the losses they 
have incurred. One of the most commonly agreed upon points, 
discussed further in Question 9 of Part 2, is the belief the 
controllers have that there will be a strong possibility that 
animosity and related problems will emanate from the FAA 
management ranks toward former PATCO members. Some of the 
expressed fears include, purposeful washouts while the 
controllers are retraining, offers of positions in 
geographical locations which are located unreasonable 
distances from the controller's current home, and abuses 
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aimed at continuing to make examples of the PATCO controllers 
and their failed actions of 1981. 
8
- If vou were to return to the FAA, do you feel your ATC 
skills would be adversely affected by twelve years away 
from the position? 
The passage of more than 13 years since the demise of 
PATCO constitutes a large portion of the careers of the 
former controllers who participated in the 1981 strike. 
These 13 years have been devoted to the search for, or 
working at, alternative vocations to the one they were 
trained to perform. The 13 year period also represents what 
would have been prime years for many of the controllers in 
terms of their proficiency in applying their ATC skills. 
This statement is based on the average amount of time the 
sample had been employed by the FAA, as related in Question 1 
of Part 1. Now, because the potential exists for fired 
controllers to be rehired, there is cause to consider how 
these controllers feel their skills have fared during the 
extended time which has lapsed since they last worked an 
ATC position. 
Results derived from the data received for this question 
indicate the sample holds confidence in its ability to 
respond to the challenge of once again controlling air 
traffic. This confidence, however, is tempered by the 
combined effects of advancing age, changing health, and 
prolonged absence from active controller duties. Indications 
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Figure 12. Part 2, Question 8. If you were to return to 
the FAA, do you feel your ATC skills would be adversely 
affected by twelve years away from the position? 
controllers is evidenced by the 29.4% who responded YES to 
this question. 
The graph in Figure 12 shows 66%, or 251 of the 380 
sample controllers believe their skills at controlling air 
traffic have not been adversely affected by the years 
spent away from their former positions. Fifty-one of these 
respondents stated the 13 year period has had minimal effect 
on their skills and they would need little retraining to 
regain their former proficiency level. Another 29 
controllers said they felt somewhat "rusty", inferring the 
probability their retraining would require additional time. 
Ten respondents cited the adage of air traffic control being 
likened to riding a bicycle, once you learn, you never 
forget. Additionally, 10 respondents answered with emphatic 
NO'S, while 12 others noted they were currently working in an 
air traffic controller capacity. None of the 12 currently 
working as ATC's mentioned having experienced difficulties in 
their retraining. 
The most common response received from the 29.4% (112) 
of the respondents who answered YES blamed advanced age, its 
accompanying deterioration of physical abilities, and too 
much time away from the job for their belief that their 
skills have been adversely affected. Returning to Question 1 
of Part 1 which asked how long the respondent had been 
employed as a controller, 16.2% or 62 controllers had accrued 
15 to 27 years experience at the time of the strike. 
Assuming these controllers began their careers at age 20, 
they would now be between 4 7 and 5 9 years of age. Advanced 
age coupled with declining health make the passing of 
stringent annual medical examinations less easy to 
accomplish. While admitting their skills have diminished, 
many of these controllers still wish to return to their 
profession, believing their experience level to be preferable 
to hiring a person with no experience. 
In the event a rehiring initiative is enacted, a 
possible area of debate may exist for either side of the 
rehiring issue regarding a controller's age versus his/her 
ability to perform ATC duties. At stake in this debate is 
the potential for the denial of consideration to some 
controllers due to their age. Because rehiring procedures 
have yet to be determined, the parameter of age may be 
restrictive, disqualifying many who feel they can do the job. 
One controller's view of this question regarding his ability, 
relevant to age, reads as follows. "No. That's an ego 
answer, my body is 48 but my brain still envisions that body 
working 20 airplanes at a time." 
9- What concerns would you have about returning to ATC? 
The ban against fired PATCO members working as air 
traffic controllers for the FAA was lifted in the fall of 
1993 by President Clinton. This act opened the doors for 
those fired controllers who have a continued desire to 
control air traffic to reapply for positions within the FAA. 
Since the ban was lifted, the FAA has received several 
thousand applications from PATCO members, however, none have 
been rehired through this initiative as of August, 1994. The 
reason given by the government for not increasing staffing 
levels with available PATCO controllers is a hiring freeze 
within the FAA because of national budgetary constraints. 
According to PATCO Lives, there remains resistance at 
the FAA to PATCO controllers being rehired. PATCO Lives and 
its network of supporters are continuing efforts to ensure 
that when the hiring freeze is ended, the fired controllers 
are given equal, if not preferential opportunity 
for employment. 
The PATCO controllers, generally in their middle aged 
years, will have decisions to make should rehiring become a 
reality. Relocation, re-qualifying, leaving current 
occupations, and family upheaval are a few of the 
considerations they have to take into account when deciding 
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to return to work for the FAA. For this reason, the concerns 
the former controllers share in returning to the air traffic 
profession are pertinent to this study, especially in light 
of the number and experience level of those expressing a 
desire to return to work. These figures are demonstrated by 
data discussed earlier in this study. The information 
obtained from this question may be of value to those 
establishing rehire parameters, in that creating a desirable 
"mix" of returning controllers may be preferable to an ad hoc 
approach to placement. 
The answers to Question 9 of Part 2 have been grouped by 
the frequency of similar comments received. The comments are 
combined into nine groups containing at least 15 similar 
responses. Question 9, unlike the others in Part 2 of the 
instrument, was not designed in a YES/NO quantifiable manner 
for graphic presentation. Rather, the alternative method of 
grouping by comment commonality was employed to enhance the 
analysis of the responses. Additionally, the reader is given 
the benefit of exposure to the shared concerns and 
apprehension held by those controllers who may return to work 
for the FAA. In organizing the responses into groups, 
accommodation was made for respondents relating more than one 
concern. Therefore, multiple responses may have been 
included from individual controllers. 
Interestingly, the most common response regarding the 
former controllers returning to work was not a concern at 
all. The response, simply stated, was "None". Seventy-three 
(19.2%) of the respondents answered in this way. From this 
comment, it appears these controllers would be receptive to 
return to work offers and would be apt to do so without 
reservation or condition. 
Approaching the most common response in frequency is the 
first response group expressing a concern. This response 
targets FAA management as responsible for the concern 65 
(17.1%) of the controllers would have in returning to work. 
The fear of vendettas and discrimination, together with the 
belief that there has been no change within the autocratic 
management structure of the FAA fuels the concern generated 
by this response. Mention was made by some controllers that 
much of the FAA leadership present at the time of the strike 
has likely been reduced through retirement and attrition. 
Others who remain, however, have been mentors for the 
succeeding generation of supervisory personnel, creating the 
belief that a self perpetuating management cycle exists. 
The third group consists of 48 (12.63%) controllers 
whose concern is the location they will be required to accept 
in order to gain employment. Many expect offers of 
reemployment will contain prohibitive, or unacceptable 
conditions of relocation. This example is representative of 
the choices PATCO controllers will have to make. An 
employment opportunity, contingent upon relocation, forces 
priority decisions to be made regarding family upheaval and 
displacement. These 48 controllers fear their opportunity 
may be lost because they will not be allowed to return to 
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their former facility or a facility near where they currently 
reside. Some submit the FAA may purposefully offer positions 
containing unacceptable relocation requirements. This, they 
feel, would present the FAA as benevolent towards the 
controllers while the controllers appear unappreciative by 
not accepting offered positions. 
The fourth group cites fair treatment as a concern. 
Questions pertaining to pay. seniority, and training will 
affect the decisions of the controllers in this group. They 
fear their pay will not be commensurate with their experience 
level, and believe they will be required to accept a position 
below that held prior to the strike. These controllers 
wonder whether they will receive credit for their past work 
and have their seniority integrated with the currently 
working controllers, or be placed below those now working. 
Also, as mentioned earlier in this study, controllers train 
other controllers via on-the-job training. The PATCO 
controllers exhibit concern that they might not be given a 
fair opportunity to retrain by some of the current 
controllers who would conduct the training. Of great concern 
in this case would be a controller who was working in 1981 
and did not support the strike having the responsibility to 
train a PATCO controller. Here, the aforementioned issue of 
animosity has the potential to become a factor in the 
training process. Thirty-four controllers, or 8.94% of the 
sample, are included in this group. 
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As indicated earlier, the majority of PATCO controllers 
are well into their middle aged years. Because of their age, 
the concern of retirement/age is a particularly critical one. 
There were 28 (2.36%) respondents who expressed this concern. 
Some because they had very little time left to go before 
attaining retirement eligibility. Other controllers 
questioned their ability, because of their age, to do the job 
after such an extended absence. 
A point which warrants comment on the issues of 
retirement and age is the fact that, in the case of new 
hires, the FAA maintains a hiring cutoff age of 31. From the 
responses received, there are relatively few controllers 
concerned with the hiring cutoff age, apparently assuming 
that because they are being considered for rehire, the age 
restriction will not apply. Concern may be warranted, 
however, since the rehiring parameters have not been revealed 
by the FAA. For example, should the FAA decide 45 years of 
age is the oldest they will consider for rehire, a large 
portion of the population would be automatically ineligible. 
Forty-five is an arbitrary figure, but the significance of 
the point is obvious. Unless forced to consider all 
applicants equally, the FAA will have the freedom to 
discriminately choose the controllers it wishes to rehire. 
The effort to lift the ban on rehiring PATCO controllers 
emphasized the experience of the fired controllers as a means 
of restoring capacity to the ATC system. Determining the 
appropriate mix of age and experience against the unknown 
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point of diminishing return as it applies to the controllers 
abilities will be a formidable task. 
The sixth concern, expressed by 24 controllers, was 
checkout. Checkout refers to re-qualifying to the full 
performance proficiency level. While approximating the 
fourth concern of fair treatment, the sixth concern is 
specific to the retraining/re-qualifying issue. The fear 
involved with this concern is the possible consequence of 
being removed from employment once again, this time due to 
lack of performance, or a perception thereof. Again, on-the-
job training is imperative to this end. Having to depend on 
the variable of individual trainers being conducive to the 
task of re-qualifying PATCO controllers creates a situation 
whereby the PATCO controllers feel they will have no control. 
The controllers may have confidence in their abilities, but 
they cannot control the attitudes of persons doing the 
training. The potential for arbitrary disqualification in 
this manner, after recommitting to the ATC profession by 
giving up present occupations and moving families, weighs 
heavily. This, added to the inherent difficulty in attaining 
a desirable proficiency level under normal circumstances 
forms the basis for the controllers' concern 
in re-qualifying. 
The seventh concern the controllers have is, the same 
conditions exist now as before the strike. Twenty-two 
(5.78%) of the respondents intimated they would be afraid 
that the perceptions they held before the strike, indeed, 
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went on strike for, remain unchanged. Many controllers hold 
hope that conditions have improved, partially accounting for 
their desire to return. Not fully knowing the present 
conditions within the FAA does cause a degree of anxiety, 
however, for controllers hoping to return to work. Some who 
struck because of conditions endured prior to 1981 will not 
return. These controllers feel whatever changes have taken 
place since 1981 fall short of what is needed to improve 
the system. 
The eighth concern group is made up of former 
controllers who desire to return to work but feel they will 
no longer meet the requirements of the annual physical exam. 
Failing eyesight, high blood pressure, and diabetes are a few 
of the medical conditions mentioned that are capable of 
causing a failure of the physical exam. In compiling the 
results for this question, it was somewhat surprising that 
there were so few (20) respondents expressing the physical as 
a concern. Based on the numerous instances throughout the 
study where physical problems were indicated as potential 
hindrances, it was expected that this figure would be 
appreciably higher. 
The ninth group with a minimum 15 respondents sharing a 
concern expresses an emotional fear most people can empathize 
with. The anxiety these 15 controllers have is in wondering 
whether they will fit-in with their new co-workers. Given 
the turmoil the strike has created in many of the 
controller's lives, it is understandable how profound the 
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feelings of these men and women will be as they return to an 
FAA facility for the first time after the passage of more 
than 13 years. 
Fitting in is assumed desirable and as such causes 
anxious moments for any employee entering a new environment. 
In the case of the PATCO controllers, the feeling associated 
with fitting in will be heightened by questions of who the 
co-workers are. If they are "scabs", will there be 
animosity? If they were hired after the strike, will they be 
upset if the returning PATCO controllers retain their 
seniority? How will PATCO controllers be received by NATCA 
controllers? These questions and others legitimize the PATCO 
controller's concern about fitting in. 
Again, the nine groups discussed in this question relate 
the most frequently echoed concerns of the sample. There 
were numerous other concerns unique to individuals which did 
not fit into the categories used. Examples of quoted 
controller concerns are included in Appendix I. 
Chapter 4 
Conclusion 
This retrospective analysis of the PATCO controllers and 
their strike offered a unique opportunity to examine the 
feelings of a particularly intriguing group of people. The 
controllers, denied the legal right to strike because of 
their federal employee status, engaged in an illegal strike 
on August 3, 1981. They did this knowing severe penalties 
could be imposed, but believing what they were doing was 
necessary- History has proven the strike was ill-advised by 
practical standards, but the majority of the sample maintains 
now, as it did in 1981, that they were justified in their 
actions. 
Question 1 of the opinionnaire, when compared to 
Question 2 regarding controller sentiment about the 
justifiability of the strike, shows a 16.5% decrease in the 
number of respondents. Eighty-seven percent of the 
controllers believed their actions were justified in 1981. 
Those who now, in retrospect, remain convinced the strike was 
a justifiable cause comprises 70.5% of the sample. Comments 
submitted by the respondents permeate the study, relating 
feelings of loss, bitterness, and remorse due to being 
removed from the careers they chose. In spite of the 16.5% 
moderation in their conviction and the losses they have 
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incurred, there is an acute sense of pride emanating from the 
responses of this group of professionals. 
By engaging the FAA in the 1981 strike, the PATCO 
controllers brought upon themselves the unprecedented wrath 
of their government. Never before had a public sector union 
been destroyed in its entirety by the government as PATCO 
was. The PATCO controllers held steadfastly to their 
beliefs, which culminated in their terminations from the FAA. 
As time passed, the increasing price paid in failed 
marriages, broken families, and lost income has taken a toll 
on how strongly the controllers believe in what they did 
versus what was accomplished by it. In retrospect the 
controllers exhibit misgivings regarding the timing, 
methodology, and economic advisability of going on strike 
when they did. 
Based on the data received from the opinionnaire, and 
the accompanying comments supporting those data, the 
hypothesis is accepted. The hypothesis stated that the 
majority of controllers would feel continued justification in 
their actions of 1981, although these feelings of 
justification would be mitigated by the fact the controllers 
lost their jobs by their action. Also, the perception of the 
current state of the air traffic control system suggests many 
of the key issues that led to the strike remain unresolved. 
The rebuilding of the FAA's air traffic system has been 
ongoing since the first day of the strike. Initially, the 
FAA used supervisory personnel and military controllers to 
73 
supplement the controllers who did not participate in the 
strike in an effort to keep the system from failing. As the 
months wore on and the military controllers returned to their 
duty stations, the FAA began to replace them with newly hired 
employees. These employees were placed after completing 
accelerated training programs at the FAA Academy in Oklahoma. 
Controversial issues surrounding the rebuilding of the 
system such as the alleged placing of previously disqualified 
candidates and a congressional inquiry into improprieties at 
the FAA Academy have surfaced during the years since the 
strike. Controller dissatisfaction continues to grow as the 
system rebuilds. This is evidenced by the formation of the 
NATCA union and its recent moves to become more aggressive in 
pressing the FAA to address a number of complaints. One such 
complaint calls for an increase in staffing. NATCA and other 
currently working controllers echo many of the same 
complaints PATCO attempted to correct, but the FAA remains 
slow to respond, adding to controller frustration. "Despite 
assurances of FAA officials and field supervisors that the 
system is working well, most observers with whom we discussed 
the issue spoke of an air traffic control system plagued by 
low morale and growing internal tension." (Nader & Smith, 
1994, p. 130). NATCA, wary of PATCO's demise and bound by a 
no-strike clause, appears similar to PATCO during its early 
years. NATCA is a voice for the controllers, but is limited 
in its ability to effect change. 
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Although some gains have been made since the strike, the 
system lacks the tools, in terms of manpower and equipment, 
to perform at optimum efficiency. According to NATCA, "Too 
often people were being certified because they needed the 
controllers, not because they possessed the prerequisite 
skills." (Nader & Smith, 1994, p. 133). PATCO controllers 
have been a ready resource that, until President Clinton 
lifted the ban, has been neglected as a solution. 
Comparisons have been drawn over the past 13 years 
between PATCO and other groups which acted against their 
government in violation of the law. One group is that of 
draft dodgers who chose to move to Canada rather than 
participate in the Vietnam war. This group was accepted back 
into the country with fewer restrictions and less persecution 
than the PATCO controllers received. 
Another comparison is one which appears as ironic as it 
does contradictory. Pictured on an Atlanta newspaper shortly 
after the strike began was a striking PATCO member being led 
to jail, manacled at the wrists, waist, and ankles. His 
crime was his participation in the air traffic controllers' 
strike. On the same front page, the newspaper carried an 
article which featured President Reagan lauding the courage 
of Polish labor leader Lech Walesa and his Solidarity union 
for engaging in a strike against an oppressive Polish 
government. Both unions, PATCO and Solidarity, participated 
in illegal strikes, but were seen in two completely different 
ways by the administration of this country. 
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The time has come, according to NATCA, President 
Clinton, ALPA, and aviation safety advocates to allow those 
PATCO controllers who wish to return to the ATC profession, 
to do so. 
"If this were simply a matter of humane consideration 
for the thousands who lost their professions, it would 
be worthwhile. But rehiring the controllers would do 
more than help individuals, it would promote the 
national interest and improve the aviation safety 
system." (Nader & Smith, 1994, p. 139). 
The opportunity exists to reinstall experience into the 
system, experience lost with the dismissal of the PATCO 
controllers. This study provides information relevant to the 
population of PATCO controllers and, as the sample indicates, 
the consensus opinion of these controllers shows a 




The purpose of this study was to determine the consensus 
opinion of controllers fired for their part in the PATCO 
strike of 1981. With that accomplished, and the majority of 
these controllers indicating they would like to return to the 
FAA, the recommendations of the researcher center around that 
point. Since it has been determined that most users of the 
system now agree benefits can be realized by the return of 
PATCO controllers, the conditions and processes required to 
implement such a return must be worked out. Negotiations in 
this regard are currently being conducted by PATCO Lives, 
other controller groups, and, as mentioned in the study, in 
the court case on the issue of rehiring after the three year 
penalty period. 
This study presented a number of fears and concerns 
PATCO controllers would have in returning to work. It is 
recommended that consideration be given to those concerns. 
If the FAA's desire is to develop a cooperative working 
relationship, the rehiring process will have to be 
administered with integrity and equality- Attention to the 
installation of safeguards ensuring fairness in the return of 
PATCO controllers to work is also deemed necessary. The 
fairness referred to is in regards to both the process of the 
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selection of candidates and the integration of those 
candidates into the system. If a rehiring occurs in which 
numerous controllers are permitted to return, it is 
recommended that an independent committee be established for 
the purpose of reviewing complaints of inequities in the 
controller•s retraining/checkout. 
Further study may be required to more precisely 
determine the extent to which the sample's skills have 
diminished. If skill levels indicate an appreciable decline 
in proficiency at a given level of traffic, or at a 
particular age, then parameters prohibiting placement of 
controllers in facilities while not properly skilled may be 
needed. The applications received by the FAA from PATCO 
members can serve as a source for the FAA to conduct its own 
poll to gain information specifically geared to those 
actively pursuing a return to work. This retrospective study 
was intended to gauge the feelings of the sample controllers 
regardless of whether they were resolved to return to work as 
an air traffic control specialist or not. By surveying only 
those actively pursuing an air traffic position, a more 
concise analysis will be available for use in establishing 
the parameters for rehire. 
The possibility of PATCO controllers regaining 
employment with the FAA is dependent on the appropriation of 
funds via budgetary approvals for increased staffing. There 
have been no PATCO controllers rehired since President 
Clinton lifted the ban on their eligibility. As hiring 
constraints are relaxed, it would be reasonable to expect 
PATCO controllers be hired as positions become available. 
The experience represented by this group is plentiful as wel 
as available and it would be advisable to tap this resource 
to improve the ATC System. 
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APPENDIX A 
PART 2, QUESTION 1 
Part 2, Question 1 
When the strike began, did you feel it was a justifiable 
cause? 
I was working 58 hours a wk and maxing out, working and 
not getting payed got old after a while. 
Understaffed - Poor equipment - working 3 man positions 
alone. 
It was basically mob rule Peer Pressure, if one did not 
participate, what fate would be yours? 
Having worked in a center, I knew a lot of the stress. 
I was 4 6 and running on nerves. But 50 was the 
retirement age. The entire profession needs looking 
at. 
Force the govt to recognize the conditions of the 
system. 
FAA was trying to destroy Union. Strike was attempt to 
save Union. 
Absolutely - 100%. 
I didn't want to strike, voted against it, but followed 
the union. 
Right battle, wrong time to fight. 
Not because of the money but because of the safety 
issues. 
There was no other choice that a loyal, Red blooded, 
American, Dedicated to Right & Fair & the American Way, 
could make. 
85% can't be wrong. 
Could have achieved more by staying in. 
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15. No question about it. 
16. The equipment was over worked and needed to be updated. 
APPENDIX B 
PART 2, QUESTION 2 
Part 2, Question 2 
n retrospect, do you now feel the strike was justified? 
More than ever, my losses don't change the principle. 
I participated only to help protect my fellow 
controllers. I did so with guilt about breaking my 
word. 
In our facility, retirement was rare. 
3.5 Billion dollars in ATC Delays in the FAA's effort 
to still keep us out. 
Justified, but unwise. A suicide mission if ever I saw 
one. 
Even though I paid dearly. 
FAA has not changed. 
Yes but I wouldn't do it again. 
Have you ever been unemployed? 
We were set-up to be scape-goats, not worth losing our 
jobs over. 
No, only with reference to staggering financial losses 
incurred by those fired. 
Yes, but not worth the pain & suffering caused by same. 
The cause was justified; the action was suicide for the 
controllers, premeditated murder by the govt. 
Damage done to families, fellow controllers, and the 
system was too great for what was gained by the public 
thus far. 
We lost, and the country resents us and our strike, the 
only people who benefitted were the scabs who replaced 
us. 
Not at the loss of all our careers. 
Modernization program is now 15 years behind schedule. 
The scabs got what we asked for. 
APPENDIX C 
PART 2, QUESTION 3 
Part 2, Question 3 
Do you feel the government had any viable alternative to 
terminating you after the 48 hour return to work ultimatum 
was issued? 
What do they (Helms & Lewis) feel about destroying the 
system so thoroughly? 
Suspension, fine, etc. but not termination forever!! 
The talent cost of controllers was not told to the 
public. 
It appears the govt didn't want a settlement. 
Much too harsh - they forgave draft dodgers. 
There was no 4 8 hr period to return. You have bought 
the FAA lie, also. We at Sacramento, CA were locked 
out & not allowed a return option. 
They could have done the wise and compassionate thing; 
i.e., bargained in good faith or found a mediator who 
could. This would also have fulfilled their legal and 
moral obligations to the flying public. 
Once the ridiculous ultimatum was issued by Reagan 
there was no backing down. 
Would John Wayne have backed down? 
There is/are/were many alternatives - however I would 
have done the same if I was in their position. 
Could have had "Cooling off" period with continued 
negotiations. 
Reagan and his cronies welcomed and encouraged the 
strike. They wanted to make a statement with the 
firings. 
Negotiate and settle the issues. 
APPENDIX D 
PART 2, QUESTION 4 
Part 2, Question 4 
Do you feel the ATC system has recovered to an acceptable 
level of safety and efficiency? 
Safety record seems to be ok. 
We found out we could be replaced. 
I fly as a pilot on a regular basis in the midwest and 
I have no fears of the system being unsafe. 
I'd like to think otherwise but the facts wouldn't hold 
up another opinion. 
As an airline pilot for 6 years I personally 
observed many deficiencies. 
I haven't flown since 1981 and I won't. The ATC system 
is unsafe because the FAA brought back people that had 
previously washed out. 
The system will never recover from the lost time, money 
and manpower wasted during the strike. 
Not according to friends on the inside. 
I worked for the City of Laredo Tower for 9 mo. The 
system has not recovered. 
Not based on what friends in the airline industry and 
at the NTSB tell me. I don't fly as a result of things 
they have told me. 
I work in it and I can tell you for sure it hasn't. 
As a commercial pilot, my confidence in the system is 
very low and it is evident that expertise and 
experience are lacking. 
I see it every day - it's in terrible condition. 
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14. My husband flys for a regional airline. He says "no 
way", J 
15. I'm still in the business and well aware of the safety 
problems. 
16. No! Definitely not. I work with a center and they 
need help BAD!! 
APPENDIX E 
PART 2, QUESTION 5 
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Part 2, Question 5 
Do you feel the current ATC workforce has benefitted by your 
sacrifice, in terms of overall working conditions? 
1. I hear the same complaints from current ATC's that we 
had in 81'. 
2. My replacement makes $80,000 per yr - thanks to me. 
3. They have told me so. One guy even had the balls to 
come and thank me. 
4. Previous GS-13 (37k) now GS-14's @ 62.5k - say what? 
5. They're still burning them out as fast as before. 
6. As a GS-14-4 in 1981 Annual Salary $42,000. As a 
GS-14-4 in 1992 Annual Salary $70,000+. 
7. They now get extra pay for time spent training other 
people. Something PATCO fought for for years. 
8. My son now works in ATC and I see it in working 
conditions, pay and benefits - but still poor 
management. 
9. Yes, they have my job - making the income I should be. 
10. Flow control; increased separation. 
11. I believe they got more than we ever wanted. 
12. I know about 15 controllers (all hired since 81') in 
several facilities, and my impression is nothing 
(management's attitude) has changed. 
13. Very much so. 
14. I understand that management has become more receptive 
to their needs and they get compensated generously for 
doing what was taken for granted in the past. 
APPENDIX F 
PART 2, QUESTION 6 
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Part 2, Question 6 
If the ban on rehiring was lifted, would you have reapplied 
for your position? 
1. Whether I'm working or not, I'm an ATC. 
2. I am in another career and have no desire to work for 
the FAA. 
3. I did reapply & was rejected. 
4. I was 1 year from retirement. Would like to get enough 
time to retire. 
5. I'm 58 years old and brain dead. I might reapply but 
only for the sport of it. 
6. The strike will not be over for me until I walk into 
the center and put on a headset again. 
7. Much better off with my health, much happier - would 
never go back - that feels good! 
8. Would like to leave job on my own conditions. 
9. I am happy at what I now do but I loved my position 
with the FAA. 
10. If only I knew what to expect. 
11. It was my chosen career. 
12. I would like to finish what I started. 
13. I'm hurtin' & have no career to support my family. 
14. I miss my profession...ATC is what I am. 
15. I loved my job. It was the bosses that sucked. 
16. Always and forever. 
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17. Why go back to what is worse now than when we left. 
18. I believe the demands of that job are too great on the 
family. 
19. I am over 50 now and wouldn't. Could still do it but 
it's not worth what it would cost me. 
APPENDIX G 
PART 2, QUESTION 7 
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Part 2, Question 7 
you feel animosity would be an issue if PATCO controllers 
returned to the ATC system? 
1. I just want to get on with my life, and help rebuild 
the system if I can. 
2. Time heals all wounds. If anyone, on either side, 
still feels any animosity after 12 years, then I guess 
I just feel sorry for them. The true professionals 
will still be true professionals. 
3. Absolutely none. 
4. 12 years is a long time to carry a grudge, isn't it? 
5. We're older and wiser. 
6. Its over. 
7. I work with FAA controllers. They want us back, no bad 
feelings. 
8. Once accepted the new ATC's would realize we are not 
the monsters they thought we were. 
9. I lost my job through my own actions - not the 
replacement action. 
10. Most of the controllers I talk to would like us back. 
11. Controllers are a lot of things, but they are not 
generally stupid. 
12. Be realistic! Some of these guys got in two years what 
some of us worked 20 years for. 
13. The old FAA will never forget. 
14. I'm still angry about being fired. 
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15. No animosity among working controllers but I've talked 
to some scab supervisors who are afraid of us coming 
back to work. 
16. I'm not interested in violence, but will never trust a 
"sprinter". 
17. There are a lot of bad feelings on both sides. 
APPENDIX H 
PART 2, QUESTION 8 
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Part 2, Question 8 
If you were to return to the FAA, do you feel your ATC skills 
would be adversely affected by twelve years away from the 
position? 
1. I had a guest shot for 30 minutes. I still have it. 
2. The aptitude for the job is the most important factor 
for success. 
3. I'm 50, maybe FSS. 
4. Affected yes, adversely no. 
5. Controlling traffic is a diminishing skill. 
6. I am a controller. 
7. I would still be 1000 times better than someone off the 
street. 
8. I'm pretty well rested now. 
9. I live by my old tower and watch the traffic, and the 
current controllers don't move traffic as efficiently 
as I do in my head. 
10. At age 60 I feel that I can still do the work. 
11. I'd be rusty, but could catch up rapidly. 
12. It's like riding a bike. 
13. I would be FPL in minimum time!!! 
14. Its a lot easier than it used to be. 
15. I was at my peak 12 years ago. 
APPENDIX I 
PART 2, QUESTION 9 
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Part 2, Question 9 
What concerns would you have about returning to ATC? 
Before it was a family, now it would be a job. 
Finding my headset HA HA. 
My bitterness toward the FAA, ALPA, and the currently 
working strike breaking scum, will not allow me to work 
in harmony with them. 
Psychic survival in a hostile environment. Whether I'd 
get a fair deal on checkout. Pretty much the same 
concerns I had before. Being a woman in the FAA is not 
an easy thing. 
They can't deal with us, controllers, thinking for 
ourselves, standing up for ourselves, we will never be 
sheep. 
Have a training instructor who has a hard on for PATCO 
folks. 
The FAA not using us to really rebuild the ATC system, 
but to just continue to make negative examples of us... 
I am not sure I would have the "love" for ATC I once 
had. 
The next strike. 
Not being able to be the controller I was when I got 
fired. 
My concerns would be that all I have sacrificed was for 
nothing. 





Dear fellow PATCO controller: Please take a moment now to 
complete the following opinionnaire. The information will be 
used in a confidential manner for a study accessing the 
retrospective and current feelings of those controllers involved 
in the strike of 1981. Your opinions are very important, so 
please answer fully and honestly and return by mail within 14 
days to: Steven Durnin-717 S. Beach St. #317C-Daytona Beach-
Fiorida-32114. Thank you very much. The results of this study 
will be made available to Bill Taylor at its completion. 
PART 1 (Please check appropriate space - explain if other) 
1. How long were you employed by the Federal Aviation 
Administration as an air traffic control specialist? 
m 
0-5 yrs 5-10 yrs 10-15-yrs. 15-20 yrs other 
2. What level of facility were you assigned to at the time of the 
strike? 
lvl 1 lvl 2 lvl 3 lvl 4 lvl 5 other 
3. What type of facility were you assigned to? 
Tower Tracon Center other 
4. In which state was the facility located? 
(fill in state name) 
5. What is your current occupation? 
(fill in occupation) 
Part 2 (Please check appropriate space - fill in comment space) 
1. When the strike begany did you feel it was a justifiable 
cause? YES NO (check one) 
comment 
2. In retrospect, do you now feel the strike was justified? 
YES NO (check one) 
comment 
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3. Do you feel the government had any viable alternative to 
terminating you after the 48 hour return to work 
ultimatum was issued? 
YES NO (check one) 
comment 
4. Do you feel the ATC system has recovered to an acceptable 
level of safety and efficiency? YES NO 
comment 
5. Do you feel the current ATC workforce has benefitted by your 
sacrifice, in terms of overall working conditions? 
YES NO 
comment 
6. If the ban on rehiring was lifted, would you have reapplied for 
your position? (answer YES or NO to each time frame) 
1 mo. to 3 yrs 3 yrs to 7 yrs 
7 yrs to 11 yrs 
Would you reapply now? YES NO 
comment 
7. Do you feel animosity would be an issue if PATCO controllers 
returned to the ATC system? YES NO 
comment 
8. If you were to return to the FAA, do you feel your ATC skills 
would be adversely affected by twelve years away from the 
position. YES NO 
comment 
9. What concerns would you have about returning to ATC? 
APPENDIX K 
PART 1, QUESTION 5 
Part 1, Question 5 
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